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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 16/05/2006

Accident number: 149

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 11/09/1997

Where it occurred: Pajak Village, Dehyak
district, Ghazni
Province
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Afghanistan

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Detection accident

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none

Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: POMZ AP frag

Ground condition: agricultural
(abandoned)
bushes/scrub
hard

Date record created: 13/02/2004

Date last modified: 13/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate metal-detector (?)
inadequate equipment (?)
inconsistent statements (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
vegetation clearance problem (?)
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Accident report
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly
"controlled" his partner.
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made available. The
following summarises its content.
The victim was reported to have been a deminer for one month, have completed a refresher
course six months before [note conflict] and had worked for 48 days since his last leave. The
ground where the accident occurred was described as medium hard agricultural land with
bushes. A photograph showed that the "bush" was sparse 18" high scrubby, multi-stemmed
leafless plants that appeared very dry and were reported to be very difficult to cut. The
demining group claimed to have found fragments of the device from which to identify it as a
POMZ.
The investigators determined that the victim did not use a tripwire feeler before using the
detector, despite the known presence of tripwire mines. They decided that he then moved the
detector head quickly and so pulled a tripwire with it.
The Team Leader stated that tripwires are undetectable with a "Philips" (Schiebel AN/19)
mine detector.
The Section Leader stated that the tripwire was undetectable. He said the problem could be
overcome by burning, except in this case an ammunition store was nearby so they could not
burn.
The victim's partner stated that the tripwire went through a "bush" so rendering it impossible
to see. He said such areas should be burnt off.
The victim blamed the presence of bush, and suggested that areas such as this should be
burnt first.

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that the accident occurred because the tripwire feeler was not
used and that the failure of the command group to tell the deminer to use a tripwire feeler was
a contributory cause.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that all Team Leaders and Section Leaders should ensure
that deminers were fully equipped and use the equipment at appropriate times, that all
detecting/prodding procedures should be carried out according to the established procedures,
and that the Section Leader should "strongly advised" about his poor command and control.
[It seems likely that tripwire feelers were not available.]

Victim Report
Victim number: 191

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Helmet

Protection used: not recorded

Thin, short visor
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Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Hands
severe Abdomen
severe Body
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
The victim's injuries were summarised as severe fragment lacerations to both his hands, his
chest and his lower abdomen.
A medic's sketch (reproduced below) showed injuries concentrated on the lower torso and
thighs, with small fragment damage on the right hand.

The demining group reported that the victim had sustained serious injuries to both thighs
when he detonated a POMZ while using a detector.
A claim was forwarded to the insurers by the UN MAC on 23rd April 1998 saying that the
victim suffered multiple penetrating injuries of abdomen anterior wall and posterior wall (both
buttocks) – gluteal and sacral regions. "Some fragments (pellets) remain". The insurers were
informed that the victim was ready to return to work on 23rd April 1998.
No record of compensation payment was found in June 1998.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim
appears to have been working incautiously and his error was not corrected. No mention is
made of his helmet and visor, which may not have been worn.
The investigators imply that some equipment may not have been available to the victim - from
which it is inferred that a tripwire feeler may not have been available. This, and the failure to
supply an adequate, working detector, is a serious failing of management. The secondary
cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment”.
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement
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was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.
Gathering of further accident and medical treatment detail was prevented by the UN
programme manager who denied all access to records in September 1999. Access has
continued to be denied up to the date of completion of this version of the database.
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